Одобрен е проектозакон за промени в Закона за отбраната и въоръжените сили на Република България

Михай Еминеску, най-големият румънски стихотворец:
Анексирането на Добруджа (превод с Google Translate):

http://www.mihai-eminescu.ro/anexarea-dobrogei-de-mihai-eminescu-19-august-1878/


THE APPROVAL OF DOBROGEI - by Mihai Eminescu [August 19, 1878]
Mihai EminescuAugust 3, 2017 Mihai Eminescu's Politics, Publicistic 1877 - 1883 TIME No Comments

On the eve of losing a part of our homeland, Bessarabia, and adding to the ancestral lands the lands around the Danube of Dobrogea, we believe that this descent needs to be explored in more depth and in many ways.

Knowing once the respective stipulations of the Berlin Treaty, we will then examine the extent to which we have the duty and the right to follow them.

The consideration that comes to our minds right from the beginning is that our acts that will have the object of fulfilling the stipulations of the Treaty are acts that we will make today and for the first time in hundreds of years on our own responsibility. Whatever we had imagined in the past about our ab antiquo rights, either with or without words, the great European powers regarded us as Turkey's vassals, as epitrophists of Europe, and the responsibility for our deeds was often of the suzerain, but more often of the epitropes, so that the parental bias of one often escapes the annoyance may be less of the parent of the other. Together with a kingdom under epitropy because of her old age, we, a young people of shepherds, who became plumbers barely since 1830, we are crouching with the ease that characterizes our European policy plans and mingle with the big ones, without the politics their pursuit of centuries of iron and giant endearment, grasping them, not serious dangers, what we are not able to do, yet, but the hardships they overlooked precisely because of our relative hanging.

But is the same case still today? Like the lost son of the gospel parable, we have lost our way from our true history, we have largely spent the parental legacy on the bare forms of a foreign civilization that we had neither the time nor the resources enough for us approaching, and today, much poorer in power than twenty years ago, we see ourselves before some questions that we must untie, although the light life so far has only wisdom us a little.

It is not the time to make each other imputations: at least not at this glance. The nation will judge at the right time those who deserve to be judged and will rebuke those who have played with her interests. We, for the time being, abstain from any controversy, we will look at the cessation of the cessation of Bessarabia and the taking possession of Dobrogea in an entirely objective and without making phrases.

The premise from which we start and which we believe that any Romanian is mindful of is that we must obey the Treaty of Berlin, especially now and at all. It would have been more worthy if, from the beginning, we followed a different path and we were honestly and courageously fulfilling the mission required by the Treaty of Paris, it would have been more likely to be common cause with peoples across the Danube barely when we could have made the rule alone and without the expensive aid of the Prut, but at last it was written in the book of fate that we should be surrounded by the lure of alienation and vanity inside and sacrificing secure and secure goods on goods not yet earned and perhaps imagined. A year ago I was able to change many of the events; nowadays the events that are fatally fattened under our yoke. Yesterday even equal powers were holding their weight and our little addition would have tilted the tongue to one side or another, today we have nothing of the importance that had given us a big and solemn moment in our lives. Not being righteous yesterday, today justice is not with us.

So let us submit ourselves to the suit, appropriate to the Treaty of Berlin.

First: Bessarabia was given to us to indicate our role at the mouths of the Danube, and the holding of that piece of land was for us a European mission. The same Europe that has given us back has found it appropriate to resume and give us Dobrogea, renewing a silent mandate under the Treaty of Paris, the proper mandate to guard the freedom of the most important artery of trade not by our own power, but by the lack of interference of a great power, whatever it is, whose predominance would become decisive through the exclusive possession of the mouths of the Danube. You are to be the owners of a good upon which all great powers want to serve the free use, our weakness is a guarantee; while a great power in our place, linked even by vowed treaties, would know with the time to discreetly dispose of such a precious asset to all or at least keep many bound and paralyze them in their political action by the grip of a navigational freedom guaranteed only by black rows on white paper. The difference between us and Europe's disputants is that they take us a province and give us another, looking at the thing in itself as very indifferent, while we feel vividly that a piece of our ancient homeland is broken, which can not be compensated by money, by new rights, or by assignment of territory. Our pain is true that it does not move anybody, but we also assume that no wise man from European diplomacy, even the opposite of ours, will not take us a name that is natural, and that he bears his justification in itself.

It is also venerated that although we stand before decisions whose full responsibility falls upon us, yet our freedom of decision and action is far from as wide as the grumbling of the moment demands. The objects of the Berlin, Bessarabian and Dobrogea treaties are occupied by the royal troops; and even the middle of the country is for a year the open way for the movement from and to Bulgaria of those troops. And yet we have to decide. More still. While we are sure of the sympathies of our Bessarabian population, we are still not sure of those of the Dobrogeans, so we can repeat the scenes happening with Austrians in Bosnia, with the Russians in Lazistan and perhaps soon with the Montenegrins in the annexed parts of Albania, with the Serbs in the lands inhabited by Moametans. This would be irrelevant if we, as a state and as a nation, share the points of view that have determined the action of all the belligerents in the book; but we - as we solemnly declared from the beginning - did not engage in a war of conquest crossing the Danube, but we only stretched our Danube defense to our defensive action. If we could not be consistent in things that others have imposed on us, let us be at least consistent in things where we are free to be.

So if, on the one hand, we obey and receive Dobrogea, on the other hand, the way we receive it, the proper way of taking possession, is harder than it would seem at first sight, difficult because of the circumstances, difficult by the necessity of to be consecutive to the declaration made at the end of the struggle, finally enduring through the way of harmonizing an annexation of territory that we have lost to the Turks for almost 500 years in our entire way of looking at things with our morality politics, with our sense of justice.

Do not look at one thing. The Treaty of Berlin really means an understanding between all the great powers, but that understanding is only formal. Under the smooth shape of articles placed on a paper that neither upset nor suspect, it still fires the enmity and the exclusivity of interests; of the peacemakers, formally and solemnly decreed, the insurgents in Bosnia, the Albanian league, the Rumelia dissatisfaction, the rebellion of the Lazes, the resistance of the Porte against the Greek claims, and for us: the mass layoff of Colonel Fălcoianu and the repatriation of the Tarshees in Dobrogea . To get along. We would have had nothing against repatriation under our auspices or under the auspices of the freely expressed will of the Dobrudjan provinces, but the repatriation of the energetic but turbulent element under the Russian occupation can have another meaning when we know the convenience with which these mercenaries of trade are put to the service of every one and when in the cases quoted, we have the right to doubt the omnipresent sincerity of the provisions of the Berlin Treaty.
We are not afraid of these people, as the Austrians are not afraid of the Bosnians or the Russians, because Dobrogea is far from having such a significant defensive power as Bosnia and Lazistan by its physical nature. But to shoot in people would mean to transform the paternal annexation into conquest, it would mean to share the point of view of the tutor of the one who would fight with the Turks in this war, would mean to become accomplices with them and to sanction this complicity, the eve of Bessarabia. With what right we complain of an injustice, which we commit ourselves the next day even? With what right we complain that our people is a foolish flock, when we treat as an unhealthy flock the parts of a people who too have great qualities, and with themselves a great and not yet groundless national susceptibility ? Or maybe the Turks of Dobrogea, with their brilliant military past, conquering themselves on three continents, can look like a flock without will, to whom it does not care what the master is?

In another issue of "Time", we anticipated the cession of principle as if it had already been decided, because the news, brought by the well-informed "Political Correspondence," as our government was going to protect the land of Dobrogea, had indignated us. The same moral principle that dictated us respect for the private wealth of Dobrogea dictates these rows, which touch the political way of taking possession. Doing what everyone does, the right to take and master the bayonet, is easy; but to preserve this Orient in its miniature, with all its mixture of people, to prove that we are fair and fair enough to keep in equilibrium and in good faith the most diverse elements is an art, it is a political policy by which politics Force is a toy.

But before we finally decide the duties that we are imposing on us, especially the annexation of Dobrogea, we take a moment to show our right to this. Our right is historical. If circumstances are likely to support it, the better; but in any case, without this support, it would be a nude right, whose use should be avoided.

Indeed, at the time of Herodotus, Dobrogea was ruled by the Getae, who, together with the Dacians, had both the banks of the Danube. In the time of Caesar Dobrogea was in the hands of the Romanians, and the Dacians and Getae had long gone from the Danube and had settled here for good. During the time of the Emperors, Dobrogea was inhabited in cities by Greek merchants, on the plains, by the Scythians, and was part of the lower Moesia province. Perhaps at that time it was the era of the province's largest development. The anonymous Cosmography of Ravenna, a compilation of the 7th century after Christ, but whose authenticity is without a doubt, quotes the cities of Dionysopolis, Bisoi, Timum, Tirissa, Callatis, Stratonis, Tomis (the place of Ovid's exile ), finally Istriopolis, all Greek merchant colonies (Cf. Ravennatis anonymi cosmographia, IV.6) and Pliny the old cite as Afrodiaias, Libistos, Zigere, Borcobe, Eumenia, Parthenopolis and Gerania. On Antonin's itinerary we count from Silistra (Durostoro) to Noviodunum (Tulcea) six more important cities; Transmarisca (Turtucaia), Capidava, Carso, Cio, Beroe, Troimis; and from Novoiodunum (Tulcea) to Callatis (Mangalia?) two cities: ad Salices and Tomi [s] (Küstengè?). If we still add some of the cities of the lower Messiah to Dobrudja, we will have the significant number of 20 cities in that province, most of which died without any trace. Remaining inheritance to the kingdom of the East, Dobrogea was roamed, like the Romanian Principalities, by peoples, hunts, avari, pechenegs, kumans, and finally by Tatar. Indeed, at the beginning of the 11th century, the Cumanians or half-citizens, a Fino-tartaric generation, left their settlement near the Volga and occupied the Romanian lands, from which they chased the Chazars and Pechenegs. As in the eleventh century, long after the arrival of the Bulgarians, the princely prince in Dobrogea was proved by many current names of streams and settlements. These were the Cumanians, the powerful allies of the Assynthians against Byzantium. Finally, in the thirteenth century, the era of the founding of the Wallachian principality, the Cumanians were taken out of the country by the Tartars who settled predominantly in Dobrudja and are still there. Their existence in those parts makes Mircea I call himself, in all its forms, the prince of the Tartar countries. Thus the province was successively ruled by all the barbarian crowds that passed through our countries, although this rule did not interrupt the lawful continuity of the Byzantine kingdom, which was handling its garrisons and provincial organization, especially in the shore towns and in the pots more or less stretched of those cities.
Successfully the Asanids have been taken by the shore towns, while the land itself seems to have remained dated. The Tartars took Mircea, the prince of the Tartar lands, Dobrudja, from Şişman Vidin and the right bank to Silistra, and kept them all until 1413 Sultan Mohamed I occupying the Romanian cities Isaccea, Silistra and Giurgiu, as well had occupied Nicopolis and Vidin, put an end to the Basarabians on the right bank of the Danube. In Mircea's time, the population of Dobrogea appears to have been mostly dwarfed.

At the time of the migration of the peoples, and thus in the time of the Bulgarians coming, and later, both Dobrogea and the Romanian lands were considered to belong to the Byzantine kingdom, namely Wallachia and Moldavia, were often only nominally part of the lower Messiah. The anonymous in Ravenna says:

Likewise over the Danube River are the following castles of the lower Messiah; Porolissos, etc., among which Sacidaba, Ponti Aluti, Romulos, Zarmisegethusa and others. which, after the Pentingerian plateau and after Ptolemy, are without any dispute here on the Danube.

Followers of the Dacians and Romans and the last possessors of Dobrogea before the conquest through Muhammad I, our historical right is well founded; but the very best support of this right is the circumstances.

Indeed, the uniform petitions of the Rumelian Bulgarians who say they will not live alongside the Mohammedans, and that some have to leave the country, the indirect approval of these petitions contained in Dondukof-Korsakof's reply; the famous program about the organization of Bulgaria, sent from Belgrade to the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung", which establishes the seizure of the fortunes of the geamies and the sale of the spirits and the prices of the real estate of the Muslims in Bulgaria, all these are capable of making the Mohammedans in Dobrogea to lose any taste of sticking to a province in which the general majority would be the local majority.

But if our historical right and circumstances are full of strong face to Bulgaria and other powers, it is not so much the same as the population of Dobrogea. In its view, the maximum justerious derogation is avail- able. The inhabitants of Dobrogea are their true owners and our historical right together with their possessions can actually be compared to an old ruler who is in line with real property, especially when this historic right was not the cause of our entry into war, especially when we declared we do not cross the Danube to conquer.

Outside of the Danube Delta and the islands, which are undeniable of ours, because they were given to us by the Treaty of Paris and are treated by us by the very nature of the territory, then, being uninhabited, we do not impose our duty to take account of the legitimate will of another, the other territory of Dobrudja is indeed received, but only as a genuine legal title, with the consent of the populations.

How people will be asked by plebiscite or other way is a detail detail. In any case, it would not be a cult of domination but of coexistence, for it is not a conquest, but a union.

This attitude we believe would be fully correct. It would be correct from the point of view of political morality, it would be in accordance with the way of seeing [a] people who, being themselves largely oppressed and subjected to strange peoples, do not want to do what they want is done.

Then we would be able to prove to ourselves how the Berlin Treaty is a sincere stipulation, and finally it would not be about the exchange of Bessarabia, at least not for our national consciousness.

It is understood that we do not give any lessons of political morality and justice. But for a small people it is dangerous to imitate the process of the great ones and its only strength is the right, the right, bound, vowed, reinforced with seven seals.
The case of consulting the population in this regard is not the first, so it is not unique. Nizza and Savoia, ceded to France by a treaty, were consulted and received annexed; Similarly, one can consult Dobrogea. Or, if this mode appears to be inappropriate with the status of Dobrogea, then another appropriate legal form will be found. On this occasion, it would also prove to be the special desires of the province and the prerogatives that would require special gifs to preserve their individuality. It would prove to be a word of cohabitation that the populations want. Our reasoning must be the following:

In the war we lost a province and won nothing; let us now see if we have enough sense of justice and if we inspire enough confidence to win a province peacefully and peacefully.

This is the only protest we can pick up without breaking anyone, but without striking in us. The sense of nationality of the Romanian people is too vivid for his government to be able to abstain from him. So, compelled to be wise in our process, and being independent now, free to die of the strongest weapon, at least until the last moment we have to preserve the pride and the sense of our justice that we absolutely need for the moment when our existence , this time hanging like a leaf on the water, would once again be put into the book. The weight is: to reconcile the exigencies of our national sense with the naturally succinct succinctness of our former ally.

If the populations of Dobrogea were against the annexation in its most mild form, eg, against the personal union, then it would be a sign: 1) that the stipulation of the Berlin Treaty relative to it was greatly undermined by the contradictions of a great power; 2) that a net has been prepared to consume our powers and means in sterile battles, the best result of which would be the conquest of a province in a largely unhealthy climate that would not bring us use for fifty years; because we do not need to say what we all know, since Dobrogea is known-that is, nearly 2,500 years-from Herodotus and to this day it was a marshy province, a little populated, very fertile, but also very unhealthy, which only under the iron rope of the Romanian people could reach a relative degree of blossoming. But as the cause of that flowering, that is, Rome, all the surface of Dobrogea, left to the discretion of the nature's agents, who ruled it, quickly became the ever-devoured desert, a desert that always attracts new colonies through its fertility, but and extinguishes with the same repulsion they attract.

MIHAI EMINESCU
OPERA POLITICA
November 1, 1877 - February 15, 1880
TIME
CRITICAL EDITION RELATED TO THE PERSPECTIVE
CRITICAL EDITION COVERED BY THE MUSEUM OF ROMANIAN LITERATURE
Coordinator DIMITRIE VATAMANIUC
Academia RSR Publishing House, 1980
Vol X